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ABSTRACT
The First World War damaged the European psyche and physically
and mentally maimed a whole generation of European men fortunate
enough to survive the maelstrom. Nowhere was this more apparent
than in post-war and Weimar Germany. For some young German
veterans, the war never ended; they simply brought it home to con-
tinue the fight in the chaotic streets of the new republic. They rev-
elled in the experience of violence, which they directed against their
enemies, real and imagined. Between 1919 and 1923, dozens of
loosely organized groups embarked on a campaign of revolutionary
terrorism designed to spark a civil war and unite the disparate ele-
ments of the German Right behind the goal of creating an authori-
tarian state. After the failure of the Hitler Putsch in November 1923,
the extreme Right altered its tactics and developed sophisticated
political organizations capable of competing for influence in the
government it once worked to destroy.  While the Weimar Republic
weathered multiple attempts to bring it down through violence, it
was overcome by a combination of internal events and the misguid-
ed attempt by the mainstream conservatives to co-opt the Nazis.
Assassinations and other terrorist acts alone did not destroy the
Weimar Republic, but those responsible for such acts conducted a
protracted, multi-faceted effort to undermine its legitimacy. The
extreme Right’s early campaign of violence destabilized the Weimar
government and both intimidated and enthralled the German people.
The Nazis deployed revolutionary terrorism in their political strug-
gle and delivered the death blow to the Weimar Republic. 
People told us that the War was over. That made us laugh. We our-
selves are the War. Its flame burns strongly in us. It envelops our
whole being and fascinates us with the enticing urge to destroy. We
obeyed . . . and marched onto the battlefields of the postwar world
just as we had gone into battle on the Western Front: singing, reck-
less and filled with the joy of adventure as we marched to the attack;
silent, deadly, remorseless in battle.1
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INTRODUCTION
The First World War began with an act of terrorism.  The assassination of
the Archduke Franz Ferdinand by Gavrilo Princip, a young member of the secre-
tive Bosnian Serb organization known as Mlada Bosna (Young Bosnia) which
was linked to another – the Black Hand – sparked a series of events that helped
plunge Europe’s great powers into a total war. Few contemporary observers real-
ized just how devastating the conflict would be. In fact, most soldiers and states-
men who cheered the declarations of war in Europe’s capitals in August 1914
fully expected to be home by Christmas. This optimism was soon extinguished
and Europe dug in for four years of a bloody war of attrition. The war damaged
the European psyche and physically and mentally maimed a whole generation of
European men fortunate enough to survive the maelstrom. Historian Michael
Geyer interpreted the First World War as a “rupture in civility,” an event mark-
ing the opening shots in an extraordinarily violent twentieth century.2
One of the war’s many legacies was the concept of industrialized killing.
Millions of men were subjected to systematic extermination at the hands of
machine warfare. Troops were dispatched to the front in trains where they were
unloaded and quickly eliminated by machine guns, poison gas, and the constant
barrage of artillery fire.  The trenches acted as mass graves and those who sur-
vived the ordeal had no objection to subjecting others to the very process they
survived. Historian Omer Bartov originated this concept and carried the analogy
to its logical conclusion when writing that “the images of violence and fantasies
of destruction that became so prevalent during the interwar period were directly
related to the reality and trauma of the front experience of 1914-1918.  It was
these fantasies that played such a major role in the enactment of genocide two
decades later.”3 However, before some veterans and their followers engaged in
the ultimate state terrorism in the form of genocide, they first took to the streets
in Germany and waged a relentless and brutal war of terror against a host of per-
ceived enemies.  
Competing with the sentimental pacifism of Erich Maria Remarque and his
All Quiet on the Western Front were a flood of memoirs and war fiction from vet-
erans who gloried in the experience of total war and found in it something liber-
ating. Ernst Jünger, a right-wing luminary and hardened veteran, declared the tri-
umph of the “new men, the running battle-tested men who are ruthless to them-
selves and others.” Junger continued, 
This war is not the end but the prelude to violence. It is the forge in
which the new world will be hammered into new borders and com-
munities. New forms want to be filled with blood, and power will be
wielded with a hard fist.  The war is a great school, and the new man
will bear our stamp. . . . The festival is about to begin, and we are its
princes.4
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The “princes” were radicalized veterans convinced of their moral, physical, and
racial superiority. Jünger and others armed those veterans with a nihilistic phi-
losophy brimming with revolutionary implications. All that was needed was the
will to act. 
Men like Jünger and Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz provided the literary voice
for what some commentators in the early 1920s called the “White Terror.”
Thousands of right-wing radicals involved in the campaign of political violence
during the first years of the Weimar Republic sought the destruction of the first
German democracy and the conquest of portions of Eastern Europe in the months
and years after the First World War. Heinz was part of a wave of returning vet-
erans and radicalized young men who responded to the total collapse of imperi-
al Germany by organizing themselves and committing violent acts. Between
1919 and 1923, dozens of loosely organized groups embarked on a campaign of
revolutionary terrorism designed to spark a civil war and unite the disparate ele-
ments of the German Right behind the goal of creating an authoritarian state.
After the failure of the Hitler Putsch in November 1923, the movement altered
its tactics and developed sophisticated political organizations capable of com-
peting for influence in the government it once worked to destroy.  
The most successful group to adapt to the post-1923 environment was the
National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP), which we know as the Nazi
Party. The NSDAP, which eventually co-opted most of the groups responsible for
the terrorism campaign of the early 1920s, brought down the Weimar Republic
from within. Among the NSDAP’s tactics were low-level street violence, mass-
media propaganda, and seeking patronage from respectable figures and organi-
zations. Like many terrorist organizations in recent history, the NSDAP began as
a movement committed to terrorism before evolving into a semi-legitimate polit-
ical organization.
Historians of political violence during the interwar period and terrorism
scholars should benefit from each other’s research and theoretical frameworks.
Despite the inherent difficulties in defining terrorism, there can be little doubt
that the postwar actions of veteran and paramilitary groups were examples of ter-
rorism. The definition of revolutionary terrorism posited by Martha Crenshaw
Hutchinson best applies to the right-wing extremists active in interwar Germany.
The definition includes four major features: first, terrorism is part of a revolu-
tionary strategy used to seize political power from an existing government; sec-
ond, terrorism is manifested in acts of socially and politically unacceptable vio-
lence; third, the targets of the violence are symbolic; and finally, the actors intend
terrorism to create a psychological effect on the population and alter its political
behavior and attitudes.5 Dozens of right-wing groups and parties followed these
precepts during various stages of their pursuit of power. Gradually, as the
NSDAP engineered unions by force and bribery, and evolved into the de facto
leader of the extreme Right in Germany, the party mixed revolutionary terrorism
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with modern political methods. However, without the systematic weakening of
the Weimar state through constant violence, the NSDAP probably would not
have defeated its rivals, let alone capitalized on the final death throes of the gov-
ernment to gain power.6
The fact that the NSDAP assumed power legally should not diminish the
fact that revolutionary terrorism during the first years of the Weimar Republic
created favorable conditions for the party’s eventual success.  This article will
demonstrate the ways in which right-wing extremists in interwar Germany
behaved as domestic terrorists by examining the origins of their extremism, the
leading personalities and organizations involved in terrorism, their guiding phi-
losophy, the tactics they used, and the targets they slated for destruction. One will
immediately identify similarities between the rise of the NSDAP and other
organizations that began in the realm of revolutionary terrorists, although the
implications for the NSDAP’s success were more consequential. Most recently,
Hamas scored a stunning political victory in the Occupied Territories. Both a ter-
rorist organization and a sophisticated political party, Hamas uses terror as a tool
against its stated enemy (Israel) and for the propaganda value among its own
people. The NSDAP distinguished itself among dozens of similar organizations
by harnessing the simple urge to destroy and integrating it into a well-articulat-
ed program. The NSDAP never abandoned political violence because it under-
mined confidence in the Weimar government by exposing its inability to provide
law and order.
Right-Wing Terrorism
In November 1918, the German emperor abdicated the throne in the face
of military collapse and revolution at home while the mainstream German Social
Democratic party (SPD) and German communists, known as the “Spartacists,”
engaged in a violent struggle to determine who would fill the vacuum. It was dur-
ing this chaotic environment that the Freikorps (Free Corps) were born.
Returning soldiers, many of whom were enraged at the uprisings in Germany,
organized themselves around usually younger officers and sought to defend
Germany’s borders from a possible invasion by the Russian and Polish commu-
nists and to restore law and order at home. The Freikorps were private armies
numbering between two hundred and four hundred thousand that received assis-
tance from the SPD-dominated Weimar government formed in January 1919.
The feeble new government feared the communists and relied on the Freikorps
to prevent further revolutionary activity. The Freikorps despised the SPD but
appreciated the veil of legitimacy provided by the Weimar government. Under
the guise of restoring order, they committed multiple atrocities against suspected
communists and others on the Left throughout Germany and during their military
adventures in Eastern Europe. After being dissolved in 1920, the remnants of the
Freikorps turned against the very government that had supported them. It was the
breeding ground for the decade of revolutionary terrorism that preceded the
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Third Reich.7 Not only was the Freikorps one of the first venues in which young
veterans were exposed to racial anti-Semitism, many of the leading figures in the
Third Reich served in the Freikorps in some capacity.8
The catch-all enemies of the extreme Right in interwar Germany were the
collective forces of “international Jewry.” Beginning in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, a handful of European academics and followers of growing pseudo-scien-
ces, such as eugenics, popularized notions of race among broad segments of the
population. Writers like Paul Lagarde and Houston Stuart Chamberlain delineat-
ed the special genius and creativity of the “Aryan” race while denigrating Jews
as racially inferior and threatening to non-Jews. Race was conceived of as a his-
torical force that was determined by biology.  Conversion, assimilation, or any
other form of integration into the nation could not change the fact that Jews were
inherently dangerous to non-Jews.  Fearing the effects of rapid industrialization,
increasing democratization, and social dislocation, many Germans embraced
racial anti-Semitism as a simple answer to a complex phenomenon. It was not
until the First World War, however, that this minority sentiment increased in
intensity and popularity.9
One reason for the spike in anti-Semitism, especially in the immediate
aftermath of the First World War, was the widespread belief among veterans that
Germany was “stabbed in the back” by left-wing revolutionaries at home while
the German army was bravely fighting on two fronts. This myth was propagated
by national heroes like Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, although he never
directly stated that Jews were to blame.10 Those already predisposed to attack
Jews made the infamous “stab-in-the-back” charge their rallying cry. According
to the logic of the extreme Right, it was not German military incompetence,
exhaustion, starvation, or disease that were to blame for Germany’s crushing
defeat – it was international Jewry, personified by rampaging Bolsheviks in the
East and manipulative capitalists in the West. German Jews could not be trusted
since their loyalty must be somewhere other than Germany. Faced with such irra-
tionality, Jews and democratic forces on the Left were vulnerable to the well-
organized campaign of domestic terrorism perpetrated by a host of paramilitary
organizations with some government support.
Freikorps proclamations, advertisements, and situation reports emanating
from the newly formed units are riddled with references to the dangers that
“Jewish-international sentiment” posed to the general population and to soldiers
in particular.11 Fueled by fear and rage at the sudden loss of conquered territory
in the East and spectacular rumors of an imminent Bolshevik invasion, the
Freikorps went on a rampage across neighboring Poland and the Baltic States.
The legacy of these campaigns – and a chilling preview of the Holocaust – was
that Jewish populations in central Europe suffered the majority of the atrocities
committed by the Freikorps in the interwar period. Few original Freikorps
records survived the Second World War but those that did include several anec-
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dotes concerning violence against Jews. Freikorps memoirs are even more
explicit in singling out Jews as a hated enemy.   
The Freikorps operated in an atmosphere of lawlessness and casual vio-
lence that easily translated into domestic terrorism inside the fledgling Weimar
Republic. A diary entry from a Freikorps captain stationed in Silesia recounted
what happened when a local Jew asked to see him. “Although I avoid meeting
Jews, I let him in to hear what he wanted from me,” the captain wrote. “And there
he stood and made a suggestion to me as an old Prussian officer!!! – I should sell
him a machine gun, which he would then give to the Poles. My answer was the
only correct one. An extremely forceful blow from my horse whip over his
crooked nose! Then my men came in and beat him half dead and took the 1000
marks he brought to buy the machine gun.” The entry stated that the Jew was
then brought before the rest of the unit where he received further beatings,
enough “so that he would have to spend six weeks in a hospital to recover his
health.”12
Attacking Jews was a symbolic act on the part of the extremists. Freikorps
advertisements and internal communications suggest that they used the fact that
some well-known German communists were Jews to galvanize public support
and attract new members.13 Riddled with references to communists and revolu-
tionaries, the Freikorps papers implied that the German Jewish population was
synonymous with treason and Germany’s destruction. This propaganda fueled
the rage of those elements of the movement already predisposed toward regard-
ing Jews as natural enemies of the German people. For the Freikorps and their
successor organizations, the war at home was to be conducted with the same bru-
tality that characterized their campaigns in Eastern Europe. The first wave of
assassinations by the German Right targeted leading communist figures with
Jewish backgrounds, like Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, and Kurt Eisner.  
In January 1919, Luxemburg and Liebknecht helped create the Communist
Party of Germany (KPD) with the goal of participating in the Weimar Republic.
Some communists, however, chose a revolutionary path, and the Freikorps were
called in to crush disturbances in Berlin. Both Luxemburg and Liebknecht were
captured and murdered. Luxemburg was beaten to death with rifle butts and
thrown into a river, and Liebknecht was shot in the back of the head. These mur-
ders sparked an orgy of violence perpetrated by the Freikorps against suspected
communists and socialists. Several corps members stood trial and were convict-
ed for the Luxemburg-Liebknecht murders, but they received extremely light
sentences. The German judicial system was notoriously biased toward right-wing
forces from the inception of the Weimar Republic. The defense lawyers argued
successfully that the Free Corps members acted out of fear because they were
involved in a chaotic situation.14 The defense also invoked the evils of
Bolshevism and noted that the defendants had a legitimate claim when they tes-
tified that beating an unarmed woman to death was a logical response to com-
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munism.15 The court exonerated the defendants by handing down laughable sen-
tences and openly celebrating the deaths of those high-profile communists.  
The Luxemburg-Liebknecht murders were planned, and many more fol-
lowed. The commanding officer of Freikorps defendant Otto Runge told him
during a jail visit, “You are an honorable man, you have carried out the orders
well, you are a hero to the whole world, and you have performed a good deed.”16
There should be no doubt that the Freikorps had a license to murder from their
own officers and, by extension, from certain branches of the Weimar government
itself. The murders of Luxemburg and Liebknecht were the opening shots in a
national terrorist campaign to undermine confidence in the Weimar Republic
during its most vulnerable period.
Brutality against the Left was celebrated by right-wing extremists and
excused by others. At the same time the Freikorps in Berlin killed hundreds, the
Bavarian Socialist Republic was declared by a handful of communist intellectu-
als led by the poet Kurt Eisner. The fact that the republic existed at all had more
to do with the complete power vacuum in Munich than it did with popular sup-
port for the soft-spoken Eisner. But the short-lived communist state in Bavaria
was an unholy entity for most of the profoundly conservative and Catholic pop-
ulation. After some communists committed atrocities of their own against cap-
tured Freikorps members, the movement reacted with characteristic excess. In
March 1919, a Freikorps unit led by Franz Epp marched into Munich and
butchered over 600 communists and socialists. The “Epp Lions” took great
pleasure in the short and bloody campaign. News of the massacre spread across
Germany and served as a warning to other Leftists and the Weimar authorities
themselves that the Freikorps were a force to be feared.   
Epp, like many Freikorps commanders, eventually rose to prominence in
the NSDAP. In 1921, he purchased the Volkischer Beobachter, the official news-
paper of the party, and in 1928 assumed control of the Sturm Abteilung (SA), the
party’s paramilitary force. Epp was devoted to the idea of destroying the Weimar
Republic through violence, but this did not prevent him from winning a seat in
the Reichstag for the NSDAP.  Documents found in Epp’s personal papers detail
how the Freikorps used terror for revolutionary goals, such as eliminating Jewish
influence. Targeting Jews was intended to remove them as a threat by intimidat-
ing them into silence. One document in Epp’s possession read: “Every distur-
bance must end against the Jews. Then they will be so afraid that their comrades
will say: Leave the Germans alone, or we will wind up in chains.”17 Violence that
delivers a message is a characteristic of terrorism. Intimidating Jews, this hated
enemy of the radical Right, was a stated objective of men like Epp and his com-
rades. The violence associated with the Free Corps was partially the result of the
chaos that followed Germany’s military collapse during the First World War, but
talented officers like Epp harnessed this violence to drive home the point that
“internal enemies” would be treated harshly. As Friedrich Wilhem Heinz wrote,
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the Freikorps continued the civil war at home with the same level of violence as
the one they left unceremoniously in November 1918.  
The severity of the Freikorps’ atrocities was lost in the chaos of the imme-
diate postwar years. It was not until the movement was dissolved and the Weimar
Republic emerged as a political reality that the right-wing extremist community
turned to true revolutionary terrorism. The remnants of the Freikorps melted into
the population and formed more secretive organizations bent on finishing what
they had begun in the streets of Berlin and Munich. Between 1920 and 1923,
extremists engaged in a calculated campaign of assassinations and other terrorist
acts against high-profile and symbolic figures within the fledgling Weimar gov-
ernment. What was more alarming than this organized terrorism was pervasive
anti-Semitic violence targeting Jewish cemeteries, synagogues, and businesses
throughout Germany. This alarming increase in postwar anti-Semitism had pro-
found implications for the status of German Jews and success of parties like the
NSDAP.18
The most infamous organization and the one responsible for the most sig-
nificant assassinations was the Organization Consul (OC). The OC was founded
by Captain Hermann Ehrhardt, a Freikorps leader, coup plotter, and popular
luminary of the extreme Right. Erhardt reasoned that the only way to destroy the
Weimar government was to convince the lower classes that the government was
incapable of representing their interests and thus provoke another wave of revo-
lution in Germany. Such chaos would, Erhardt believed, unite right-wing ele-
ments behind a national dictator. The OC acted to spark this revolution by sys-
tematically murdering key Weimar politicians and leftist figures.19 OC member
and popular author Ernst von Salomon actually named the targets:
“Scheidemann, Rathenau, Zeigner, Lipinski, Cohn, Ebert and all the men of
November [November Revolution of 1918] must be killed. Then we shall see
whether or not there are uprisings in the Red Army, the Independent Socialist
party, and the Communist party.”20 The official face of the OC was carefully con-
structed to meet the legal requirements for a political organization in the new
democracy.  The OC constitution admitted its goals included “struggling against
. . . internationalism, Judaism, Social Democracy and radical leftist parties,” but
so did countless other organizations and political parties. The OC also declared
that it would struggle against the Weimar constitution “in word and speech.”21
Weimar authorities knew the game the OC and a host of similar organizations
played, but they lacked both the political will and resources to stop them.  
Founded in Bavaria, the OC enjoyed legal protection and even financial
resources from a sympathetic government.22 Bavaria was a hot bed of right-wing
extremism, and it was no secret that the government and local military units sup-
ported the efforts of the OC and dozens of other paramilitary organizations
wholeheartedly. The president of Bavaria, Gustav Ritter von Kahr, openly
despised the Weimar government in Berlin and identified with upstart leaders
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like Adolf Hitler and Hermann Ehrhardt. Munich served essentially as a secure
base where radicals could plot freely against the government.23 Kahr even pro-
tected extremists who were wanted for crimes in other parts of Germany.  He and
the German military forces in Bavaria acted as state sponsors of terrorism
because they provided groups like the OC and the NSDAP with political, finan-
cial, and military support. As is the case for many more recent terrorist organi-
zations, state-sponsorship (or at the very least, benign neglect) facilitated the
extremists’ terrorist acts.  
The OC was a tightly organized, hierarchical organization directed by
Erhardt and a handful of others comprising the “Munich Central.” Below the
Central were 13 “gauleiters” responsible for recruiting and supervising local
cells. Cells formed wherever possible. The Weimar government estimated that
the total strength of the OC was approximately 5,000 members.24 In addition to
murdering politicians, the OC, like the Freikorps, meted out swift punishment
against members suspected of collaborating with the authorities or in any way
betraying the secrets of the organization, specifically the dozens of weapons
caches hidden throughout Germany. This punishment, which sometimes includ-
ed death, was administered by ad hoc tribunals comprising extremists.  The so-
called “Feme courts” were modeled after medieval courts that administered swift
and violent justice.25 The fact that the OC was both diffuse and highly organized
indicates it operated with relative impunity. Organizations like the OC existed on
several planes, only one of which was secretive and conspiratorial. Extremist
groups regularly published newspapers and held rallies against the Weimar gov-
ernment, but the core members actually performed the terrorist acts.
The assassination that had the greatest impact was that of Foreign Minister
Walther Rathenau. The aftermath of the act, which involved no less than five
members of the OC, revealed the extent to which anti-Weimar and specifically
anti-Semitic sentiment had become popular in Germany. Rathenau was from a
powerful and historically important Jewish family. Intensely patriotic, Rathenau
was responsible for organizing Germany’s industrial resources and managing its
war economy during the First World War. However, his selection as foreign min-
ister confirmed the worst fears of the extreme Right. German racists believed that
Jews were responsible for destroying Germany and perceived Rathenau as some-
one who would deliver Germany on a silver platter to the hated international
forces of communism and capitalism. In June 1922, Rathenau was gunned down
on his way to work by two assassins. Most Germans were not surprised by the
murder, and a significant number celebrated. In the six months since he had
assumed the post, German students had begun a popular chant: “Strike down
Walther Rathenau/The God-damned Jewish sow!” After his murder the chant
was altered: “Someone struck down Walther Rathenau/Hurrah! When is the next
Jewish pig?”26 Alarmingly, more respectable voices shared in this joy. Thomas
Mann recalled hearing an eminent professor rejoicing in the prospect of “one less
Jew.” Nobel prize-winning physics professor Philip Lenard told his students that
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they could not observe Rathenau’s burial and be “idle on account of a dead
Jew.”27
Although Rathenau’s murder sent shockwaves throughout Germany, it
failed to provoke the revolution sought by the extreme Right. However, the long-
term effects were significant because it was the first time in the four years of
political violence that a Jew in a prominent position was murdered for being just
that. The murder was more shocking than those of Luxemburg and Liebknecht
because Rathenau was a well-respected politician with an international reputa-
tion. His crime was his race and his role in trying to legitimize the Weimar gov-
ernment abroad. Other politicians labeled as “November criminals,” a reference
to Germans who accepted the hated Peace of Versailles, suffered Rathenau’s fate.
Matthias Erzberger, a well-respected Catholic politician and leader of the mod-
erate Center Party, had been murdered in 1921. Historian Carole Fink maintains
that the murder of Walther Rathenau “foretold not only the destruction of the
Weimar Republic but also the threat to the existence of the Jews of Germany and
Europe.”28
The Weimar government responded to the wave of political violence by
banning organizations like the OC, but this was generally ineffective, as para-
military groups simply re-surfaced with different names, organizational charts,
and constitutions. The government created new law enforcement organizations
like the Reich Commissioner for the Surveillance of Public Order and passed a
host of laws to entangle groups in court and drain their resources.29 Left-wing
critics also mobilized and attempted to counteract the extremists by properly
labeling them in the public mind as terrorists. Journalist Emil Julius Gumbel
exposed the blatant favoritism German judges showed right-wing defendants in
contrast to those on the Left. Gumbel also analyzed the ideology and motivation
behind the perpetrators. Gumbel noted, “The organization’s extremist attitudes
lead them to believe that by killing one’s political opponent, one can thereby do
away with the ideas he stands for.” Gumbel also highlighted the role youth
played as “terrorists” and lamented that they truly believed they were acting in
the tradition of Brutus by killing the “few Republicans that Germany possess-
es.”30
Government pressure forced extremist groups to diversify their tactics. In
response to the crackdown, propaganda took precedence over assassinations and
street violence. After the spectacular failure of the Hitler Putsch in November
1923, the NSDAP evolved into one of the most sophisticated political organiza-
tions in the Weimar Republic. The party mastered multi-media propaganda,
developed disciplined fighting units like the SA to combat enemies and attract
new members, and exploited the hate and fear of many Germans who would have
otherwise ignored a small, militant party like the NSDAP. Hitler enjoyed the
irony that he could destroy the government he despised by waging a successful
political campaign. Several terrorist organizations in recent history, such as the
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Irish Republican Army, Hezbollah, and Hamas, have made the transition from a
pure terrorist group to a semi-legitimate political organization. They diversified
in the interest of influencing their respective political environments.31 The
NSDAP also began as a terrorist group before its leadership realized that the gov-
ernment they hoped to overthrow would likely survive simple violence.   
CONCLUSION
The Third Reich was the logical outcome of the campaign of political and
racial violence orchestrated by the extreme Right in postwar Germany. As
Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson noted, revolutionary terrorism is used “because it
seems to be the appropriate means to achieve certain ends, such as general inse-
curity and disorientation in the state, control of the civilian population, demoral-
ization of the adversary, or publicity.”32 The high-profile assassinations of
Weimar officials and political enemies were aimed at accomplishing all of the
above. Breaking down Crenshaw’s four-part definition of revolutionary terror-
ism, one can state with confidence that the extreme German Right and the
NSDAP in particular fit the profile of revolutionary terrorists. They used terror-
ism to seize political power from an existing government; engaged in both
socially and politically unacceptable violence; attacked symbolic targets, such as
Jews and socialists; and finally, used violence to alter the political behavior and
attitudes of the masses. Only after the Weimar government survived the initial
onslaught between 1919 and 1923 did the extreme Right infiltrate the govern-
ment and bring it down from within. The extremists’ revised strategy was not to
defeat the state  but to become the state.  
Nazi Germany was a terrorist state with all of the resources of an industri-
alized nation at its disposal. The Nazi quest for a racial utopia was characterized
by the ultimate form of state-sponsored terrorism: genocide. The tragedy is that
while the Weimar Republic weathered multiple attempts to bring it down through
violence, it was overcome by a combination of internal events and the misguid-
ed attempt by the mainstream conservatives to co-opt the NSDAP. Assassinations
and other terrorist acts did not destroy the Weimar Republic, but those responsi-
ble for such acts conducted a 12-year, multi-faceted effort to undermine its legit-
imacy. The extreme Right in Germany did not pursue revolutionary violence dur-
ing its most successful years, but its early campaign of violence destabilized the
Weimar government, and both intimidated and enthralled the German people.
The NSDAP, in particular, deployed revolutionary terrorism in its arsenal and
delivered the death blow to the Weimar Republic.  
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